In March 2011, 72 passengers left the Libyan coast heading in the direction of Italy on board a small rubber boat at the time of NATO’s military intervention in Libya. Despite several distress signals relaying their location, as well as repeated interactions with at least one military helicopter and a military ship, they were left to drift for 14 days. As a result of the inaction of all state actors involved, only nine of the passengers survived. By combining their testimonies with wind and sea-current data as well as satellite imagery, Forensic Oceanography reconstructed the liquid traces of this event, producing a report that served as the basis of several legal complaints.

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In our interview with Dan Haile Gebre, one of the survivors, we tried to depart from formats of witnessing normally associated with humanitarian organizations.

Rather than placing the emphasis on the subjective dimension of his experience, we used various memory aids—such as photographs of naval and aerial assets that were present in the area at the time of the events—to assist him in remembering details that could support the reconstruction of the event, and the identification of the various vessels and aircraft encountered by the vessel while at sea.

Summary of Key Events

1. The vessel left the port of Tripoli between midnight and 2:00am (all times GMT) on 27 March 2011 with seventy-two migrants on board. At that time, as part of the military operations in Libya, NATO was enforcing an arms embargo in the central Mediterranean. As a result, during that period it was the most highly surveilled area of sea in the world.

2. At 2:55pm on 27 March, the boat was spotted by a French aircraft that transmitted its coordinates (point A on the map to the right) to the international Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC).

3. After proceeding toward the Italian island of Lampedusa for between fifteen and eighteen hours, the migrants placed a distress call by satellite phone. The vessel’s GPS location was determined at 4:52pm on 27 March 2011 (point B) by the satellite phone provider Thuraya. Shortly thereafter, the MRCC in Rome signaled the boat’s distress and position to all vessels in the area. It also alerted Malta’s MRCC, and NATO HQ Allied Command, in Naples.

4. The migrants’ vessel continued its course for approximately two hours before being flown over by a helicopter. The satellite phone fell into the water shortly after this sighting, so the last signal detected by Thuraya at 7:08pm on 27 March (point C) likely gives us the approximate location of the helicopter sighting. The migrants approached several fishing boats in this area for help, but were ignored. They were also visited a second time by a military helicopter. It dropped some biscuits and water onto the boat before leaving. Between midnight and 1:00am, the vessel resumed its course towards Lampedusa.

Points on the map refer to key events. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

5. At approximately 7:00am on 28 March, after having probably entered the Maltese Search and Rescue (SAR) area, the vessel ran of fuel and began to drift SSW (point D).

6. The boat drifted SSW for seven to eight days before it encountered a military ship between 3 and 5 April (point E). Despite approaching them in circles and witnessing the distress of the passengers, the ship left without assisting them.

7. The boat continued to drift until April 10 when it landed southeast of Tripoli at Zlitan. Upon landing, eleven migrants were still alive; two died shortly thereafter.

Slide presented by Vice-Admiral Gortney at a US Department of Defence news briefing on 24 March 2011. The image shows the US & Coalition Maritime Forces 'laydown' location of vessels a few days before the migrants left Tripoli. A total of 38 ships are indicated. The naval presence in the central Mediterranean Sea continued to grow in the following days. (US Department of Defence)

The NATO Maritime Surveillance Area (MSA) between 23 March–8 April 2011 within the framework of the arms embargo off the coast of Libya. (NATO)

Alerting the Coastguard

Information about the migrants’ situation circulated through a complex assemblage of people, electromagnetic signals and hardware.

The initial call for help was made by the migrants themselves via a satellite phone, fifteen to eighteen hours after they had departed from Tripoli.

The passengers called an Eritrean priest based in Rome, Father Zerai, who has received hundreds of distress calls from the Mediterranean over recent years. He informed the Italian coastguard of the situation.

The coastguard, after obtaining the GPS location of the boat from the satellite phone provider Thuraya, informed their Maltese counterparts and NATO’s Maritime HQ in Naples, as well as sending out two distress signals to all nearby ships.

As such, all vessels in the area—civilian and military—should have been aware of the location of the vessel, and its perilous situation.

On 28 March 2011 at 04:06 GMT the initial warning was circulated by the World Wide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS). It called for all vessels in the vicinity of the Strait of Sicily to keep a 'sharp lookout, assist if possible.' (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Drift

According to the survivors, in the early hours of 28 March 2011 their vessel ran of fuel and began to drift aimlessly for the remainder of its trajectory. Where exactly did the boat begin to drift, and what course did it follow?

These are questions that we addressed in collaboration with oceanographer Richard Limeburner (Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute). With his help, we were able to reconstruct the trajectory of the boat during its fourteen days of deadly drift, by analysing winds and currents.

According to that reconstruction, the vessel briefly entered the Maltese search and rescue zone, though for the majority of its trajectory it remained within the NATO maritime surveillance area.

Our drift model provides day-by-day estimates of the vessel's location. The drift trajectory was reconstructed by analysing data on winds and currents collected by buoys in the Strait of Sicily. Over time, the margin of error in the drifting vessel's track decreases linearly as it is constrained by the known position of landing. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Use of satellite imagery

Satellite imagery confirmed the presence of a high number of ships in close proximity to the drifting vessel. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite imagery is routinely collected over the Mediterranean Sea for various purposes, including the policing of illegalised migration.

Using these media to document the crime of non-assistance of people in distress at sea thus involved a strategic repurposing of images and surveillance technologies. In this we exercised a ‘disobedient gaze’, one that refuses to disclose clandestine migration but seeks to expose instead the violence of Europe’s border regime.

Map produced by the European Commission's Joint Research Center, showing the density of SAR images in the Mediterranean Basin. (European Commission)

The report included a survey of all available radar data within the Strait of Sicily for the period, from iTerraSAR-X, PALSAR, COSMO-SkyMed, Radarsat-1, Radarsat-2, and Envisat-1. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Sensing technologies

Optical and SAR satellites are only two among a vast array of sensing technologies—thermal cameras, sea-, air- and land-borne radars, and vessel-tracking technologies—that scan the surface of the sea, turning certain physical conditions into digital data according to specific protocols, and determining conditions of visibility for certain events, objects, or people.

The constant emission and capture of different electromagnetic waves operated by these technologies gives a new material meaning to Fernand Braudel’s metaphor of the Mediterranean as an ‘electromagnetic field’ in terms of its relation to the wider world. These sensing technologies do not simply create a new representation of the sea, but rather constitute a new sea altogether, one that is simultaneously composed of matter and media.

While optical satellite imagery forms images of the Earth’s surface by detecting the solar radiation reflected from targets on the ground, SAR imaging uses an antenna to transmit microwave pulses towards the Earth’s surface. The microwave energy scattered back to the satellite is measured, and an image is formed by utilising the time delay of the returning signals.

Calm sea surfaces appear dark in SAR images, whereas ships reflect most of the radar energy back to the sensor, appearing as bright pixels against a uniform background.

Envisat-1 data reveals characteristics present on the surface of the sea - different degrees of sea roughness and currents, returns indicating the presence of ships. The two bands are caused by a sensor-related error. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Detailed analysis of Envisat-1 image taken on 29 March 2011. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Detailed analysis of Envisat-1 image taken on 29 March 2011. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Detailed analysis of Envisat-1 image taken on 29 March 2011. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Analysing signals

AIS (Automatic Identification System) is a ship-borne transponder system that sends out a signal to coastal or satellite receivers, providing live information regarding the position of all registered vessels. The system is mandatory for large commercial ships, but not for warships and other certain categories of vessel.

Forensic Oceanography analysed AIS data in conjunction with SAR imagery in the attempt to ‘negatively’ identify military ships in the vicinity of the migrants’ vessel, by determining which large vessels were not accounted for in the AIS data.

Inconsistency in the dataset for that period and area—probably due to an absence of recorded data along the Libyan coast—ultimately meant that the AIS data could not be matched satisfactorily with satellite imagery targets. Nevertheless, the data provided a remarkable snapshot of commercial maritime traffic though the Strait of Sicily.

Envisat-1 data for 29 March 2011 with a corresponding table of returns documenting the estimated length of vessel and degree of confidence that the data is correct. (Forensic Oceanography and Lawrence Fox III, 2012)

Radarsat-1 data from 4 April 2011. White indicates 'returns', which indicates the location of vessels. The dotted area on the eastern side contains too much 'background noise' to detect vessels. (Forensic Oceanography and Rossana Padeletti, 2012)

AIS data from 28 March 2011, with overlaid analysis. (Forensic Oceanography and Donald Ferguson, 2012)

A satellite image from 28 March 2011 with vessel detection (white) and AIS data overlaid (purple). (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Search and Rescue conventions

The 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (S&R) divided the world’s oceans into search and rescue areas. The countries overseeing each area are responsible for assisting people in distress at sea.

However, the elastic nature of international law has often been strategically mobilized by coastal states to avoid engaging in rescue missions. In the central Mediterranean, in particular, the delimitation of S&R zones has a long and conflict-ridden history. Tunisia and Libya have refrained from defining the boundaries of their S&R zones, while Italy and Malta have overlapping S&R zones and are signatories to different versions of the S&R convention—a situation which has led to repeated stand-offs and tragedies, and certainly contributed to the events of the ‘left-to-die boat’ case.

Global map of Maritime Search and Rescue (S&R) areas. (International Maritime Organisation)

Map of the S&R zones in the Mediterranean. (Not for reproduction)

Legal Cases

Our report has been presented in the context of multiple legal cases concerning non-assistance at sea which have emerged from the efforts of a coalition of European NGOs.

The coalition includes: The Aire Centre, Agenzia Habeshia, Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana (ARCI), Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI), Boats4People, Canadian Centre for International Justice, Coordination et initiatives pour réfugiés et immigrés (Ciré), Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (FIDH), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI), Ligue belge des droits de l’Homme (LDH-Belgique), Ligue française des droits de l’Homme (LDH-France), Migreurop, Progress Lawyers Network, Réseau euro-méditerranéen des droits de l’Homme (REMDH), and Unione Forense per la Tutela dei Diritti Umani (UFTDU).

Response by the Canadian government to a Freedom of Information request filed by Forensic Oceanography in relation to the case.

A letter from Gil Arias, deputy executive director of FRONTEX, the European Union's border and coastguard agency, detailing the coordinates of the 'operational area' of its assets at the time of the incident.

In this letter, Richard Froh, NATO's deputy assistant secretary general for operations, concedes that 'this tragedy appears to have been... in some ways caused by an apparent lack of communication between many of those involved.'

A map produced by the French Ministry of Defence on 23 October 2012 to demonstrate that French vessels could not have known of or intervened in the fate of the 'left to die' boat. A French reconnaissance aircraft photographed the vessel on 27 March 2011. (Ministère des Armées)

Map showing the extent of the area controlled by FRONTEX within the framework of their Joint Operation EPN Hermes Extension 2011. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

International civil society response

Cases have been filed in France, Italy, Belgium, and Spain, while Freedom of Information requests have been submitted in Canada, the US, and the U.K. These initiatives, as well as an investigation by the Council of Europe and by several journalists, have forced states and militaries to release further data about the event.

The facts of the case as present by FO’s report have never been contested, but what official information has been provided in response remains vague and incomplete, and we are still unable to determine legal responsibility for the deaths.

The maps produced by FO in relation to this case have been circulated widely in the international press, in activist circles, and in legal and political documents. Modified, cropped, deformed, misspelled, and redrawn, they have nevertheless spurred discussion around this case and spread that discussion across legal, political and media forums.

Press release on the Human Rights Watch website relating to the case of the 'left-to-die' boat. (Human Rights Watch)

Forensic Oceanography map featured in appendix to a report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: 'Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible?' (Council of Europe and Forensic Oceanography, 2012)

Interactive map taken from the online edition of the Guardian, redrawn from a Forensic Oceanography original. (The Guardian)

A map produced from Forensic Oceanography's original for the online edition of El Pais, indicating the position of a Spanish warship in relation to the trajectory of the boat. (El Pais)

A map produced from Forensic Oceanography's original for BBC News. (BBC)

Dan Haile Gebre, a survivor from the boat, sketches details of his story in an interview with Forensic Oceanography's Lorenzo Pezzani. (Forensic Oceanography, 2012)