Methodology

Geolocation

We collected and examined images and videos taken by witnesses of the blast and shared on different platforms online. Using details about the smoke, fires, and explosions, we were able to geolocate each piece of footage and calculate the camera’s cone of vision. We places the cameras in the open source 3D model of the city , which we had adjusted to match the necessary precision. This helped us to identify the precise location of the source of the smoke plume within Warehouse 12 in each frame of each footage.

Smoke plumes are continuously transforming and have a unique shape at every moment. We used the shape of the plumes to synchronize those videos we found without metadata.

We identified four separate smoke plumes emanating from different parts of the warehouse within the space of fourteen minutes. Each of these smoke plumes, with their distinct shape and colour, provide indications as to the arrangement of goods in the warehouse, and the way the fire developed.

The source of the first smoke plume on the north east of the warehouse. (Forensic Architecture)

The source of the third smoke plume on the north west of the warehouse. (Forensic Architecture)

Using photographs taken in January 2020 (first published by the New York Times) and a video from December 2019 (released by Al Jadid), we mapped the interior of the warehouse and estimated the area occupied by 2,750 bags of ammonium nitrate.

Image match of a photograph showing the position of bags of ammonium nitrate within the warehouse overlaid on a 3D model of the warehouse. Original image from anonymous source, January 2020. (Forensic Architecture, 2020)

Image match of a photograph showing the position of bags of ammonium nitrate within the warehouse overlaid on a 3D model of the warehouse. Original image from anonymous source, January 2020. (Forensic Architecture, 2020)

Some of the materials reportedly stored inside the warehouse, including the twenty-three tonnes of firework and 1000 car tires are not visible in the available images and videos.

With Gareth Collett CBE, an explosives expert for the UN, we mapped the different kinds of smoke emanating from the warehouse. An analysis of the colour and location of the source of smoke plumes and fires helped estimate which material were burning at which time and roughly where in the buildings they were located.

Mr Collett contended that from an engineering perspective, the arrangement of goods within the building was the spatial layout of a makeshift bomb on the scale of a warehouse, awaiting detonation.

According to Collett, ‘Ammonium Nitrate is extremely difficult to detonate by fire alone. However, when confined and contaminated, this… can lead to catastrophic detonation. It is sensitised by the presence of even the smallest quantity of additives and hence should be separated.’

Comparison

Internationally accepted regulations such as British and Australian standards, set out the ways sacks of AN should be stored in separate batched. our study suggest that this was not followed.

A comparison of the layout of the elements stored inside warehouse 12, and how they are required to be laid out according to the British and Australian standards. (Forensic Architecture)

These regulations also prohibit the storage of combustible or explosive materials such as tyres or fireworks, in proximity to ammonium nitrate, again, such guidance was not followed.

This fact highlights the multiple layers of state negligence which led to this tragic explosion.